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1.

I.

INTRODUCTION

HIS article reviews judicial developments in Texas environmental
law between October 1, 1999 and September 31, 2000. The Texas
legislature did not convene during the Survey period.

II. JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENTS
During the Survey period, Texas appellate courts heard several environmental cases. The first case involved the issue of whether the State's
anti-dumping statute requires a culpable mental state. The second case
addresses questions regarding whether failing to follow certain statutory
procedural prerequisites affects subject-matter jurisdiction. The third
case involves a number of issues about the Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission's (also referred to as "the Commission") wastewater permit exemption for certain shrimp research facilities. The fourth
case pertains to the Commission's review of contested case hearing requests on permit applications, and the fifth case deals with the issue of
unconstitutional delegation of legislative powers. The sixth case concerns
landowner challenges to a permitted discharge to an intermittent stream
as causing property damages. The seventh and eighth cases determine
that the plaintiff's claim in both cases were barred by statute of limitations because of publicity of the release in one case and the fact that
discussion of the problem with government agencies and others had put
them on notice of their claims in the other case. Two other cases decided
during the Survey period involve environmental insurance provisions, but
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they are not discussed in this review.'
A.

CULPABLE MENTAL STATE FOR TEXAS ENVIRONMENTAL

CRIMINAL PROVISIONS

1. The Texas Anti-Dumping Statute Requires a Culpable Mental State
of at Least "Recklessness"
In the case Ex Parte Bennett Weise,2 the Appellant, Bennett Weise,
challenged the lower court's denial of his motion to quash the information charging him with violating the Texas "anti-dumping" statute 3 and
the denial of his pretrial habeas corpus application. Weise argued that
the anti-dumping statute was unconstitutional, as applied to him, for lack
of a culpable mental state. In other words, Weise challenged imposition
of strict liability for violation of an environmental statute.
The state charged Weise 4 with violating section 365.012 of the Texas
Health and Safety Code, specifically, subsections (a) and (c). Subsection
365.012(a) provides that "[a] person commits an offense if the person disposes or allows or permits the disposal of litter or other solid waste at a
place that is not an approved solid waste site . . . .
Subsection
"5

1. See Mid-Continent Cas. Co. v. Safe Tire Disposal Corp., 16 S.W.3d 418 (Tex.
App.-Waco 2000, writ denied). In Mid-Continent Casualty, the plaintiffs filed suit against
the defendant/insurer seeking a declaratory judgment that the defendant had a duty to
defend the plaintiff in three lawsuits brought by neighboring residents for damages allegedly suffered as a result of smoke from a fire on plaintiffs' premises. The Waco court of
appeals affirmed the trial court decision with the following two findings: 1) that the pollution exclusion in the insurance policy did not apply to exclude coverage for damages because the rubber chips and wire from which the fire originated were desired products, and
did not constitute "waste" under the policy; and 2) that defendant insurer had a duty to
defend, and the award of attorney's fees and costs to the insureds was proper. See also,
Pilgrim Enters., Inc. v. Md. Cas. Co., 24 S.W.3d 488 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2000,
no pet.). In Pilgrim Enterprises, the insurance company claimed it had no duty to defend
its insured when plaintiffs filed suit for personal injuries and property damages allegedly
caused by long term exposure to perchloroethylene and other hazardous substances released from dry cleaning facilities. The issue was whether the injuries and damages from
contamination "occurred" under Texas law at the time the harm was "discovered" for coverage under the parties' occurrence-based insurance policy. The Houston court of appeals
held that the answer is "no"-for such policies: the injuries could occur as the exposure
took place. Thus, the court found that the insurance company owed the insured a defense
because the pleadings alleged damages for the exposure during the policy periods. For
more details on these cases, please see the insurance review of the SMU Texas Survey.
2. 23 S.W.3d 449 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. for review granted).
3. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 365.012 (Vernon Supp. 2000).
4. By misdemeanor information, the State charged that Weise did:
...
unlawfully, transport litter and other solid waste, namely, HOUSEHOLD
TRASH, having an aggregate weight of more than fifteen pounds and less
than 500 pounds, and a volume of more than thirteen gallons and less than
100 cubic feet, to a place that was not an approved solid waste site for disposal at the site.
...unlawfully, dispose, allow, and permit the disposal of litter and other solid
waste, namely HOUSEHOLD TRASH, having an aggregate weight of more
than fifteen pounds and less than 500 pounds, and a volume of more than
thirteen gallons and less than 100 cubic feet, at a place that was not an approved solid waste site.
Weise, 23 S.W.3d at 450.
5. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 365.012 (Vernon Supp. 2000).
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365.012(c) provides that "[a] person commits an offense if the person
transports litter or other solid waste to a place that is not an approved
solid waste site for disposal at the site."' 6 Neither provision contains a
culpable mental state, and Weise argued that a culpable mental state is
required by section 6.02 of the Texas Penal Code. 7 This provision provides 1) that a person does not commit a criminal offense unless he intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or with criminal negligence engages in the
prohibited conduct, and 2) where the prohibited conduct does not prescribe a culpable mental state, a culpable mental state of intent, knowledge, or recklessness is required unless the definition plainly dispenses
with any mental element. 8 Thus, the Houston Court of Appeals was left
to decide whether the illegal-dumping statute plainly dispenses with any
mental element.
a.

Texas Case Law has Established Six Factors for Assessing
Whether a Statute Requires a Culpable Mental State

The court reversed the lower court's ruling and ordered the information dismissed after concluding that the anti-dumping statute requires a
culpable mental state. 9 The Penal Code and a prior decision by the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals required that the court review the relevant
statute to determine whether an affirmative statement that the conduct is
a crime even though done without fault exists. The statute must manifest
an intent to dispense with a culpable mental state. Offenses that are punishable by incarceration have particularly strong presumptions against
strict liability. Where several provisions use the term "knowingly" and
one does not, this can be enough to show that the legislature intended to
dispense with a culpable mental state. This not true with respect to the
illegal dumping statute.
The First District Court of Appeals reviewed the trash dumping statute
based upon a Texas Court of Criminal Appeals decision, Aguirre v.
State,10 that set out a significant level of guidance regarding when a criminal statute should require a culpable mental state if it is silent as to such a
6. Id.
7. Ex parte Bennett Weise, 23 S.W.3d 449, 452 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2000,
pet. for review granted).
8. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.02 (Vernon 1994). Section 6.02 of the Penal Code
provides as follows:
(a) Except as provided by Subsection (b), a person does not commit an offense unless he intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or with criminal negligence engages in conduct as the definition of the offense requires.
(b) If the definition of an offense does not prescribe a culpable mental state,
a culpable mental state is nevertheless required unless the definition plainly
dispenses with any mental element.
(c) If the definition of an offense does not prescribe a culpable mental state,
but one is nevertheless required under Subsection (b), intent, knowledge, or
recklessness suffices to establish criminal responsibility.
9. Id. Weise, 23 S.W.3d at 455. The appeals court reviewed the trial court's decision
under the abuse of discretion standard. Id. at 451 (citing Ex parte Ayers, 921 S.W.2d 438,
441 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no writ)).
10. 22 S.W.3d 463 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).

2001]

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

1357

state. Specifically, courts are to inquire "whether an intent to dispense
with the requirement of a culpable mental state is manifested by other
features of the statute."'1
The court then turned to the application of the public health doctrine
enumerated in a U.S. Supreme Court decision, Morisette v. United
States.12 This doctrine holds that certain actions that impair public health
and welfare, such as violations of food protection statutes, can be criminally prosecuted since ordinary care would prevent violations from occurring. 13 In addition, the punishments are usually not severe and do not
impair the offender's reputation. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
has imposed strict liability for certain environmental violations, such as
air and water pollution; however, the court pointed out that the Water
Code now provides for knowing violations, and the air pollution statutes
now provide for culpable mental states when they impose criminal
14
liability.
The court arrived at its conclusion after applying six factors developed
in Aguirre.'5 That case addressed whether a culpable mental state was
required in an El Paso ordinance that regulated adult businesses but was
silent as to whether a culpable mental state was required. In Aguirre, the
Court of Criminal Appeals set out guidelines for determining whether a
statute plainly dispenses with a mental state element or whether the legislature meant to impose strict liability. The six factors cited in Aguirre are:
1) the legislative history of the statute or its title or context; 2) the severity of the punishment (the more severe the punishment, the less likely the
legislature intended to impose strict liability); 3) the seriousness of the
harm to the public expected to follow from the forbidden conduct (the
more serious the consequences to the public, the more likely the legislature intended to impose strict liability); 4) the defendant's opportunity to
ascertain the true facts; 5) the difficulty prosecuting officials would have
in proving mental state for this type of crime (the greater the difficulty,
the more likely the legislature intended strict liability); and 6) the number
of prosecutions to be expected (the greater the number of prosecutions,
16
the more likely the legislature intended to impose strict liability).
b.

Application of those Six Factors Indicates that the Texas AntiDumping Statute Requires a Culpable Mental State

Next the court applied the guiding rules and principles of Aguirre to
section 365.012. The court acknowledged that the statute was a public
health and safety law, which normally imposes strict liability. 17 However,
11.
12.
13.
pet. for
14.
15.
16.
17.

Weise, 23 S.W.3d at 452.
342 U.S. 246 (1952).
Ex parte Bennett Weise, 23 S.W.3d 449, 453 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2000,
review granted).
Id.
Id. at 454.
Id.
Id.
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the court believed this factor was diminished by the relatively minor danger posed by illegal dumping. 18 In assessing the other factors, the court
noted that it is uncertain that requiring a culpable mental state of at least
"recklessly" would make illegal dumping offenses more difficult to
prove. 19 The court also noted that it is difficult to predict the number of
prosecutions that might be expected under the illegal dumping statute,
much less what effect the addition of a culpable mental state of at least
"recklessly" would have on that number. For these reasons, the court
concluded that these were neutral factors in its analysis. 20 The court also
concluded that the fact that Weise is an ordinary citizen and that the statute in question does not direct itself solely to businesses favor interpreting the statute as requiring a culpable mental state.2 1
Ultimately, the court was most persuaded by the factor assessing the
severity of the punishment imposed by section 365.012, which could be up
to one year in jail. The court considered that factor to be particularly
weighty when the punishment of the anti-dumping statute was compared
with the fine imposed by the Aquirre ordinance, which was found to require a culpable mental state. As a result, the court held that a culpable
mental state of at least "recklessly" was likewise required for the antidumping provisions under section 365.012.22 The court held that Weise's
information was unconstitutional because it lacked a culpable mental
state; therefore, denying appellant's habeas corpus petition was an abuse
23
of discretion.
B.

STATUTORY PREREQUISITES AND SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION

IN APPEALS OF THREE CONTESTED CASE DECISIONS

1. When the Decision in a Contested Case Hearing is Appealed to a
District Court, the Failure to Serve Citations on All Parties
of Record is not an Issue Affecting Subject-Matter
Jurisdiction
The case Sierra Club and Downwinders at Risk v. Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission24 involved judicial review of a Commission order. There, the Commission had granted TXI Operations, L.P.
("TXI") a permit to burn solid waste in TXI's cement kilns in Midlothian.
Sierra Club and Downwinders at Risk (plaintiffs) challenged the issuance
of the permit in a contested case hearing.2 5 In addition to the plaintiffs,
the parties of record to the contested case hearing included the Commission's Public Interest Counsel, and seven individuals (referred to hereaf18. Id. at 454-55.
19. Ex parte Bennett Weise, 23 S.W.3d 449, 454-55 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
2000, pet. for review granted).
20. Id. at 455.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. 26 S.W.3d 684 (Tex. App.-Austin 2000, pet. ref'd).
25. Id. at 685.
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ter as "the other parties"). After the Commission granted the permit, the
plaintiffs sought judicial review in district court alleging numerous errors
of law in the Commission's decision and naming the Commission as the
sole defendant. 26 The Commission was served with citation and appeared
by filing an original answer containing a general denial. Although the
other parties of record received copies of the plaintiffs' petition, they
were not served with citation requiring them to appear and answer. Because plaintiffs failed to serve a citation upon every party to the action,
the district court decided to dismiss the appeal for want of subject-matter
27
jurisdiction.
In arriving at its decision, the district court construed the plaintiffs' petition as alleging a single statutory cause of action under section 361.321
of the Texas Health and Safety Code and section 2001.176 of the Texas
Government Code, a part of the Administrative Procedure Act
("APA"). 2 8 Because these statutes require service of citation on the
other parties, which plaintiffs did not do, the district court dismissed for
want of subject-matter jurisdiction citing the doctrine requiring strict
compliance with such provisions established by the Texas Supreme Court
29
in Mingus v. Wadley.

The Austin Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal of the complaint
and remanded on the grounds that plaintiffs' failure to comply strictly
with all requirements for service of process did not deprive the trial court
of jurisdiction. 30 The court began its analysis by reviewing the two statutory provisions with which the plaintiffs had not complied. The first provision, section 361.321 of the Texas Health and Safety Code, had two
applicable subsections. Subsection 361.321(a) provides that "[a] person
affected by a decision ...

of the commission may appeal the action by

filing a petition in a district court of Travis County. '31 Subsection
361.321(c) provides that in such actions "the petition must be filed not
later than the 30th day after the date of the.., decision" and "[s]ervice of
citation must be accomplished not later than the 30th day after the date
on which the petition is filed."'32 The second statute, subsection
2001.176(b)(2) of the APA requires that "a copy of the petition must be
served on the state agency and each party of record in the proceedings
before the agency."'33 Although the Commission, the sole defendant
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 685-86; see also TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 361.321 (West Supp.
2000); TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 2001.176 (West Supp. 2000).
29. 285 S.W. 1084, 1087 (Tex. 1926). In Mingus, the Texas Supreme Court held that
when a plaintiff asserts a purely statutory cause of action to recover a statutory remedy,
subject-matter jurisdiction is not presumed in the reviewing court. The record must show
affirmatively that the plaintiff complied strictly with the statutory procedures for transferring the controversy from the administrative venue to the district court. Id.
30. Sierra Club and Downriders at Risk v. Tex. Natural Res. Conservation Comm'n,

26 S.W.3d 684, 688 (Tex. App.-2000, pet. ref'd).
31. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 361.321(a) (West Supp. 2000).
32. Id. at § 361.321(c).
33. TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 2001.176(b)(2) (West Supp. 2000).
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named in the plaintiffs' petition, was served with citation within the time
required, the citation was not served on the other parties of record before
the 30th day after the plaintiffs filed their petition. 34
a.

Under the Mingus Doctrine, When a Plaintiff Asserts a Purely
Statutory Cause of Action, the Plaintiff Must Strictly
Comply with the Statutory Procedures for
Transferring the Matter to District Court
in order to Demonstrate Subject-Matter Jurisdiction

Next the court reviewed case law. In E.R.S. v. McKillip, the Austin
Court of Appeals had held that subsection 2001.176(b)(2) required that
each party of record in an agency proceeding be served with a copy of the
petition attached to a citation issued and served. 3 5 Further, the court had
ruled that simply serving "notice," as was done in the immediate case, did
not satisfy the statute. 36 Moreover, the court acknowledged that McKillip provided that compliance with section 2001.176(b)(2) was essential to
the reviewing court's subject-matter jurisdiction under the Mingus doctrine-the same doctrine relied upon by the district court. 37 But the
court also noted that since the district court's decision, the Texas Supreme Court had overruled Mingus in Dubai Petroleum Co. v. Kazi "to
the extent that it characterized the plaintiff's failure to establish a statutory prerequisite as jurisdictional. '38 The Dubai decision would be critical in the Austin Court of Appeals' decision to reverse the district court's
decision.
b.

Under Dubai, Plaintiffs Need not Plead the Statutory Elements
to Demonstrate Subject-Matter Jurisdiction

In Dubai, the Texas Supreme Court expressly overruled the part of the
Mingus opinion that required plaintiffs to plead the statutory elements to
demonstrate affirmatively that the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction. 39 The Dubai case involved a statute that gave citizens of foreign
countries the right to maintain a wrongful-death action in Texas courts
provided that the decedent's country of citizenship afforded reciprocal
consideration to United States citizens under a treaty. 40 The supreme
court held that the plaintiffs' burden to demonstrate the existence of such
a treaty was not a jurisdictional prerequisite, but rather a condition upon
which their right to relief depended. 41 As the court of appeals noted, the
34. Sierra Club, 26 S.W.3d at 686.
35. Employees' Ret. Sys. v. McKillip, 956 S.W.2d 795, 799 (Tex. App.-Austin 1997,
no pet.).
36. Id.
37. Sierra Club and Downriders at Risk v. Tex. Natural Res. Conservation Comm'n,
26 S.W.3d 684, 686 (Tex. App.-Austin, pet. ref'd).
38. Id. (quoting Dubai Petroleum Co. v. Kazi, 12 S.W.3d 71, 76 (Tex. 2000)).
39. Dubai Petroleum Co., 125 S.W.3d at 71.
40. See TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.031(a)(4) (West Supp. 2000).
41. Dubai Petroleum Co., 12 S.W.3d at 76-77.
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Texas Supreme Court overruled the long-standing Mingus doctrine primarily because the classification of such "statutory prerequisites" as issues of subject-matter jurisdiction results in judgments that are
perpetually "vulnerable to delayed [collateral] attack for a variety of irregularities that" often result from "a good-faith mistake in interpreting
the law."'42 Under the new doctrine established by Dubai, such "irregularities" or "statutory prerequisites" no longer raise issues about subject'43
matter jurisdiction, but instead go "to the right of the plaintiff to relief.
Thus, the court of appeals concluded that the next step in its analysis was
to determine whether the service-of-citation defect at issue in the immediate case was the type of "irregularity" or "statutory prerequisite" that
the supreme court intended to remove from the issue of subject-matter
44
jurisdiction.
c.

The Service-of-Process Defect was not the Type of Defect that
the Texas Supreme Court Intended to Affect SubjectMatter Jurisdiction

First, the court of appeals noted that those terms do not include matters that are traditionally and undoubtedly elements of subject-matter jurisdiction. As general examples, the court cited the general constitutional
or statutory delegation of power conferred on a court, or a special jurisdictional statutory provision that dictates the kind of cause to be heard
and the kinds of relief to be awarded. 45 As a specific statutory example
of the latter, the court cited section 2001.174 of the APA. 46 That provision empowers the reviewing court to examine the agency record for error in cases of substantial-evidence review; however, if prejudicial error is
found, the statute only allows the reviewing court to reverse or remand
47
the case to the agency.

In contrast, the court noted that the citation requirements in subsection
361.321(c) and subsection 2001.176(b)(2) "do not define, enlarge, or restrict the class of causes the court may decide or the relief that may be
awarded. ' 48 Thus, the court reasoned, failure to comply with the requirements in those provisions would not be "a defect that goes to the district
court's subject-matter jurisdiction under Dubai. ' 49 Accordingly, the
court concluded that the district court had erred in dismissing the plaintiffs' cause of action, reversed the judgment of dismissal, and remanded
50
the cause to the district court.
42. Id. at 76 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 12 cmt. (b), at 118).

43. Id.
44. Sierra Club, 26 S.W.3d at 687.

45.
46.
47.
48.

Id.
See TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 2001.174(2).

Id.
Id.

49. Sierra Club, 26 S.W.3d at 687.
50. Id.at 688. Justice Mack Kidd concurred in the result reached by the majority
opinion, but on different grounds. Justice Kidd noted that the plaintiffs brought their appeal in district court under sections 382.032 and 361.321 of the Health and Safety Code
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WASTEWATER DISCHARGE PERMIT EXEMPTION FOR
SHRIMP RESEARCH FACILITIES

1.

The TNRCC's Wastewater Permit Exemption for Certain Shrimp
Research Facilitiesis Valid

In addition to the Sierra Club case, the Austin Court of Appeals also
decided a case involving the Commission's rulemaking powers in the context of shrimp research facilities in Lower Laguna Madre Foundation,Inc.
v. Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission.51 The Loma Alta
Trust ("Loma Alta") filed an application requesting authorization to construct and operate a shrimp research facility under the exemption requirements provided by subsection 321.272(b)(3) of the Texas
Administrative Code. 52 Subsequently, the Commission's executive director sent a letter granting the exemption and including a list of requirements that Loma Alta must satisfy to retain its exempt status.53
Thereafter, the Commission's general counsel asked the Commission to
review the executive director's grant of the exemption to Loma Alta, and
a public hearing was held on the issue. At the public hearing on Loma
Alta's exemption the Appellant, Lower Laguna Madre Foundation ("the
Foundation"), expressed its concerns about the dangers to native shrimp
from the introduction of non-native species. After considering the comments presented by Loma Alta and by the Foundation at the public hearing, the Commission affirmed the executive director's decision to grant
Loma Alta's exemption. The Foundation challenged the Commission's
decision regarding Loma Alta in district court. Both the Foundation and
Commission filed cross-motions for summary judgment. 54 The district
court granted the Commission's motion for summary judgment, while denying the Foundation's motion. 55
(the "Clean Air Act") and section 5.351 of the Texas Water Code, none of which contain
detailed provisions regarding the steps necessary to appeal a ruling, order, decision, or
other act of the Commission. Id. at 689; see also TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.

§ 382.032 (West Supp. 2000); TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 5.351 (West 2000). But as Justice
Kidd pointed out, nowhere within the organic statutes governing the Commission is there
any requirement that the applicant be served at all. Sierra Club, 26 S.W.3d at 688. The
procedural requirements that plaintiffs failed to follow are in the APA, not the organic
statutes. Justice Kidd stated that subsection 2001.176(b)(2) of the APA section applies
only in the absence of other controlling provisions. Id. He argued that in the immediate
case, other applicable statutes exist that explicitly deal with service and notice of appeals
made pursuant to the Clean Air Act, Solid Waste Disposal Act, and the Water Code. Id.;
see also TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 361.321, 382.032 (West 2000); TEX.
WATER CODE ANN. § 5.357 (West 2000). Thus, Justice Kidd reasoned that the APA provision was inapplicable to this appeal. Sierra Club, 26 S.W.3d at 689. In other words, none
of the provisions applicable to the instant case required service of citation on all parties
involved at the agency level. Id. at 689.
51. 4 S.W.3d 419 (Tex. App.-Austin 1999, no pet.)
52. See 30 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 321.272(b)(3) (West 2000).

53. Lower Laguna, 4 S.W.3d at 421.
54. Id. at 422.
55. Id. at 428.
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The TNRCC's Rules Provide an Exemption from Wastewater
Permitting for Certain Shrimp Research Facilities

On appeal, the court was asked to address the four issues raised by the
Foundation. The first issue addressed by the court was how to interpret
the inartfully drafted subsection 321.272(b)(3). 56 The court concluded
that by reading the rule as a whole and after considering the rulemaking
history, the rule's language could be reconciled to provide that those
shrimp research facilities that do not discharge in excess of five million
gallons per day and not more than thirty days per year are exempt from
57
the individual wastewater permit requirement.
b.

The TNRCC Satisfied the Legal Requirements in the Texas
Water Code in Promulgating the Shrimp Research

Facility Exemption
Next the court examined an issue raised by the Foundation regarding
section 26.040 of the Texas Water Code, which grants the Commission
some discretion in regulating certain waste discharges by rule rather than
by permit. The Foundation argued that in promulgating section 321.272
the Commission overstepped its limited discretion and violated the statutory requirements established in section 26.040 by 1) failing to include
specific conditions and requirements regulating the discharges from
shrimp research facilities, and 2) determining that individual permits
would be unnecessarily burdensome for shrimp research facilities and for
58
the Commission.
Section 26.040 generally allows the Commission to establish, by rule,

requirements and conditions for the discharges of waste for certain facilities for which requiring individual permits would be unnecessarily burdensome both to the waste discharger and the Commission.5 9 The court
noted that in promulgating section 321.272, the Commission had estab56. Subsection 321.272(b)(3) reads as follows:
An aquaculture facility that discharges within the coastal zone ... must obtain an individual wastewater discharge permit . . . if the facility contains,
grows, or holds aquatic species as described in any of the following three
categories:
(3) Shrimp species in ponds, raceways, or other similar structures at:
(A) a shrimp research facility that discharges less than 30 days per year but at
a flow rate that exceeds five million gallons on any single day of discharge or
(B) any other shrimp aquaculture facility regardless of production or discharge quantity.
30 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 321.272(b)(3)(A), (B).
57. Lower Laguna, 4 S.W.3d at 423.
58. Id. at 424.
59. Section 26.040 of the Water Code reads in pertinent part:
Whenever the Commission determines that.., the general nature of a particular type of activity which produces a waste discharge is such that requiring
individual permits is unnecessarily burdensome both to the waste discharger
and the Commission, the Commission may by rule regulate and set the requirements and conditions for the discharges of waste.
TEX. WATER CODE § 26.040.
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lished adequate qualifications for discharge limitations for shrimp research facilities and that exempt facilities must also comply with other
regulatory requirements. 60 The court also noted that the executive director's letter to Loma Alta granting the exemption contained additional
licensing, reporting, and notification requirements. Based on these additional requirements, the court concluded that the Commission established
sufficient conditions and requirements in the rule to satisfy the regulation
requirements of section 26.040.61 Furthermore, the court noted that section 26.040 gives the Commission discretion to determine what type of
discharges may be regulated by rule and that the Commission did not
overstep its discretion in determining that the rule permits shrimp re62
search facilities.
c.

The TNRCC Order Adopting the Shrimp Research Facility
Exemption Contained a Reasonable Justification

The third issue addressed by the court was whether the order adopting
section 321.272 contained a "reasoned justification" that substantially
63
complied with the requirements of subsection 2001.033(1) of the APA.
Under this provision, an agency must provide a reasoned justification that
includes a summary of comments received on the rule, a restatement of
the rule's factual basis, and the reasons why the agency disagrees with
party submissions and proposals. 6 4 The Foundation argued that the order
adopting the shrimp research facility exemption failed to provide a reasoned justification. The court disagreed, holding that the Commission
hoped to encourage beneficial shrimp research projects by eliminating
65
the prohibitively expensive process of obtaining an individual permit.
By citing several examples, the court recognized that the Commission sufficiently answered comments in the adoption order and provided reasoned explanations for its decision to allow exemptions for shrimp
research facilities. In concluding that the Commission substantially complied with the reasoned-justification requirement, the court held that the
Commission's responses explained how and why the Commission reached
the conclusions it did and that, after considering the comments66in full, the
commission had provided adequate rationale for its decision.
d.

The TNRCC's Failure to Provide an Appeal in the Exemption
did not Prejudice the Foundation's Substantial Rights

Finally, the court addressed the issue of whether the Commission's failure to provide for an appeal in the exemption in section 321.272 had
60. TEX.
61.
S.W.3d
62.
63.

ADMIN. CODE

§§ 321.272(f), (h) (West 2000).

Lower Laguna Madre Found., Inc. v. Tex. Natural Res. Conservation Comm'n, 4
419, 424 (Tex. App.-Austin 1999, no pet).
Id.
See TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 2001.033(1) (West 1999).

64. Id. § 2001.033(a)(1)(A)-(C).

65. Lower Laguna, 4 S.W.3d at 426.
66. Id. at 425.
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prejudiced the Foundation's substantial rights. The court began its analysis by noting that section 5.122 of the Water Code provides that any person affected by an action delegated to the executive director "may appeal
the executive director's action to the Commission unless the action is a
decision.., specified as final and appealable by the Commission rule that
delegates the decision to the executive director. '67 The Foundation requested that section 321.272 be declared invalid because it failed to provide for an appeal to the Commission as required by section 5.122. The
court held that although such a failure is an error of law, the Foundation's
substantial rights were not prejudiced because the Foundation did receive
a review of the executive director's decision by the full Commission. Furthermore, as the court noted, the Commission also invited the Foundation to submit written comments on the matter and to present oral
argument at the public hearing. Thus, the court overruled the last of the
Foundation's points of error and affirmed the district court's summary
68
judgment in favor of the Commission.
D.

TNRCC

REVIEW OF HEARING REQUESTS ON
PERMIT APPLICATIONS

1. A Hearing Requestor May Be Entitled to a Preliminary Hearing to
Present Evidence in Support of the Hearing Request
In May 18, 2000, the Austin Court of Appeals issued an opinion on
rehearing that addressed how hearing requests on permit applications are
to be evaluated in cases not subject to House Bill 801 ("HB 801").69 In
that case, United Copper Industries, Inc. ("United Copper") applied to
the Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission ("TNRCC" or
"the Commission") for a permit to construct and operate two copper
melting furnaces in Denton, Texas. 70 Because the permit application was
declared administratively complete before September 1, 1999, the application was not subject to the public participation provisions of HB 801 or
the TNRCC rules promulgated to implement HB 801. 71 Following public
notice of the application, Joe Grissom ("Grissom") sent a letter to the
TNRCC requesting a contested case hearing on United Copper's permit
application. 72 Grissom's letter indicated that he lived about two miles
downwind from the proposed facility and that he was concerned about
the negative impact that he thought United Copper's emissions would
have on his health and the health of his two sons, all of whom suffer from
67. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 5.122(b) (West 1985 & Supp. 2000).
68. Lower Laguna, 4 S.W.3d at 426.
69. See United Copper Indus. v. Grissom, 17 S.W.3d 797 (Tex. App.-Austin 2000, pet.
dism'd). HB 801 was enacted by the Texas Legislature in 1999 and applies to most state
environmental permit applications that are declared administratively complete after September 1, 1999. Tex. H.B. 801, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999).
70. Grissom, 17 S.W.3d at 800.
71. See 30 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 39.1, 50.2, 55.1.

72. See Grissom, 17 S.W.3d at 800.
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serious asthma. 73 Although the TNRCC Executive Director and United
Copper filed written responses urging the Commission to deny Grissom's
hearing request, Grissom never replied to those responses or submitted
any evidence to support his hearing request. 7 4 The Commission denied

Grissom's hearing request because it concluded that Grissom's hearing
request was unreasonable and that Grissom had not satisfied the regulatory requirements for a hearing request. 75 The Commission then issued
United Copper's air quality permit. 76 On review, the district court reversed the Commission's decision and remanded the case to the Commission for a preliminary hearing. 77 The court ordered the Commission to
conduct a preliminary adjudicative hearing at which Grissom would be
provided an opportunity to present competent evidence in support of his
hearing request.

78

On appeal, the Austin Court of Appeals agreed that Grissom was enti79
tled to a preliminary hearing and affirmed the district court's judgment.
The court first found that Grissom was an "affected person" as contemplated by the Texas Clean Air Act and the TNRCC rules.80 The court
then determined that the Commission acted unreasonably by denying
Grissom a meaningful opportunity to offer evidence in support of his
hearing request and an opportunity to refute evidence offered by United
in GrisCopper in it response to Grissom's hearing request. 8 1 The court
82
som specifically limited its holding to the facts of that case.
a.

The Question of Whether a Hearing Requestor is an "Affected
Person" Must Not Be Confused with the Question of
Whether the Hearing Requestor Will Ultimately
Prevail on the Merits

In their appeals, United Copper and the TNRCC contended that Gris83
som was not an affected person as defined by the TNRCC rules.
United Copper relied upon the modeling data it provided to the Commis73. Id.

74. United Copper Indus. V. Grissom, 17 S.W.3d 797, 800 (Tex. App.-Austin 2000,
pet. dism'd).
75. Id. at 801.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 806. In its original opinion, the Austin Court of Appeals had reversed the
district court's judgment based upon its conclusion that the Commission's denial of Grissom's hearing request was not invalid, arbitrary, or unreasonable. Grissom, previously reported at 2000 Tex. App. LEXIS 737 (Feb. 3, 2000). However, on motion for rehearing,
the court later withdrew its earlier opinion and affirmed the judgment of the district court.
Grissom, 17 S.W.3d at 800-06.
80. United Copper Indus. V. Grissom, 17 S.W.3d 797, 803-04 (Tex. App.-Austin
2000, pet. dism'd).
81. Id. at 805.
82. Id. at 806.
83. Id. An affected person "has a personal justiciable interest related to a legal right,
duty, privilege, power, or economic interest affected by the application." 30 TEX. ADMIN.
CODE § 55.29(a).

2001]

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

1367

sion in arguing that Grissom could not be an affected person because the
unrefuted evidence established that Grissom's health, safety, and property would not be affected. 84 The Austin Court of Appeals rejected that
argument, stating that "the data merely suggests that Grissom may not be
affected to a sufficient degree to entitle him to prevail in a contested-case
hearing on the merits. ..85 The court found that United Copper had
confused the question of standing and the affected person requirement
for requesting a contested case hearing with the ultimate question of
whether a hearing requestor will prevail on the merits. 86 Because Grissom lived two miles downwind of the proposed facility and because Grissom and his sons suffer from serious asthma, the court was convinced that
Grissom "is more likely than other members of the general public to be
adversely affected by the facility." '8 7 Accordingly, the 88court ruled that
Grissom had satisfied the affected person requirement.
b.

The TNRCC Must Provide a Hearing Requestor a Meaningful
Opportunity to Demonstrate that His Hearing Request is
Reasonable and to Present Competent Evidence

United Copper and the TNRCC also argued that Grissom's hearing
request was unreasonable and that the hearing request was not supported
by competent evidence. 89 For permit applications not subject to HB 801,
a hearing request will only be granted if the request is reasonable and
supported by competent evidence. 90 The Austin Court of Appeals concluded that the Commission's decision to deny Grissom's hearing request
"denied Grissom a meaningful opportunity to offer evidence in support of
his request and a chance to refute the proof offered by United Copper." 91
The court rejected the argument that Grissom's failure to submit evidence of the reasonableness of his request resulted from Grissom's own
mistake and failure to satisfy the burden of offering evidence in support
of his hearing request. The court observed that the published notice instructing how to request a contested case hearing, the TNRCC's response
to Grissom's hearing request, and the TNRCC's letter describing the basis on which the Commission would decide to grant or deny the hearing
request all failed to indicate that the Commission's decision could depend
upon whether Grissom offered specific evidence in support of his request.
In addition, the TNRCC rules did not require hearing requestors to submit evidence in conjunction with their hearing request. 92 Accordingly,
84. Grissom, 17 S.W.3d at 803.
85. United Copper Indus. V. Grissom, 17 S.W.3d 797, 803 (Tex. App.-Austin 2000,
pet. dism'd).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 803-04.
89. Id. at 804.
90. Id.; see also 30 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 55.27(b)(2).
91. United Copper Indus. V. Grissom, 17 S.W.3d 797, 804 (Tex. App.-Austin 2000,
pet. dism'd).
92. Id.
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the court held that "the Commission acted unreasonably in not granting
Grissom a preliminary hearing affording him a meaningful opportunity to
'93
present evidence.
2.

Grissom May Not Extend to Permit Applications Subject to HB 801

HB 801 and the TNRCC rules implementing HB 801 modified the public participation process for permitting applications and replaced the reasonableness standard for hearing requests with the HB 801 standard
requiring relevant and material disputed issues of fact.94 Although the
pre-HB 801 statute and rules may not have afforded an affected person a
meaningful opportunity to present competent evidence absent a preliminary hearing, HB 801 and the public participation rules were created to
for the purpose of facilitating public involvement and participation in the
environmental permitting process. 95 HB 801 and the TNRCC rules provide the public several opportunities to voice their concerns about a pro96
posed permit and to raise specific issues regarding a proposed project.
Under HB 801 and the amended TNRCC rules, if the Commission finds
that a hearing request raises disputed issues of fact that are relevant and
material to the Commission's decision of whether the permit applicant
has satisfied all substantive law requirements governing issuance of the
97
permit, a contested case hearing will be granted on those specific issues.
Accordingly, a preliminary hearing is probably not required under the
HB 801 process, which affords the public a meaningful opportunity to
present evidence regarding whether the issues raised are disputed, relevant, and material.
E.

UNCONSTITUTIONAL DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER

In FM Properties Operating Co. v. City of Austin, the Texas Supreme
Court ruled that section 26.179 of the Texas Water Code ("TWC") is an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. 98 Section 26.179, enacted in 1995, allows private landowners of at least 500 contiguous acres
within certain municipalities' extraterritorial jurisdictions ("ETJs") to
designate water quality protection zones on their property. 99 The crea93. Id. at 805-06. Justice Jones filed a dissenting opinion, in which he disagreed that
Grissom had not been provided a meaningful opportunity to present competent evidence
in support of his hearing request. Id. at 807-08.
94. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 382.056(n); TEX. WATER CODE § 5.556(d);
see, e.g., 30 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 55.201(d)(4).
95. See generally, 24 Tex. Reg. 9015 (Oct. 15, 1999).
96. See generally, TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 382.056; TEX. WATER CODE
§§ 5.552 - .556; 30 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 39.411, 39.418, 39.419.
97. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 382.056(n); TEX. WATER CODE § 5.556(d); 30
TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 55.201(d)(4).
98. 22 S.W.3d 868, 870 (Tex. 2000).
99. Id.; TEX. WATER CODE § 26.179. Water quality protection zones are generally
established to facilitate development and to protect the quality of water within the zone.
FM Props. Operating Co., 22 S.W.3d at 870. When a zone exists, the city is powerless to
collect fees, exercise eminent domain, and enforce ordinances and other requirements. Id.
at 872,
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tion of water quality protection zones in effect exempts landowners from
applicable regulations, including those pertaining to water quality, and
insulates landowners from certain city fees and the city's eminent domain
authority. 100
1. The Authority to Designate Water Quality Protection Zones Under
Section 26.179 of the Texas Water Code Constitutes a
Delegation of Legislative Power to Private
Landowners
In evaluating the constitutionality of TWC section 26.179 on its face,
the Texas Supreme Court first determined whether the statute delegated
legislative powers to private landowners. The supreme court found that
TWC section 26.179 delegates legislative powers to certain landowners,
including the power to regulate water quality on their property by creating water quality protection zones and the power to avoid enforcement of
municipal regulations. 10 1 The court explained that under the statute, certain landowners were given the legislative power "to decide whether and
how to apply section 26.179 to their property, to make rules to implement
section 26.179, and to ascertain conditions upon which the statute may
operate. '10 2 The court applied the test for delegation of legislative power
03
outlined in Texas Boll Weevil EradicationFoundation,Inc. v. Lewellen.
If the Boll Weevil weigh against the constitutionality of the statutory delegation of legislative authority, the statute is unconstitutional. 0 4 The supreme court found that "there is no meaningful governmental review of
the landowners' actions, there is inadequate representation of those affected by the landowners' actions, the landowners have pecuniary inter100. FM Props. Operating Co., 22 S.W.3d at 870, 872.
101. Id. Under TWC § 26.179, landowners may exempt themselves from enforcement
of water quality ordinances, land use ordinances, nuisance abatement, platting and subdivision requirements, pollution control and abatement programs or regulations, and "any environmental regulations." Id. (citing and quoting TEX. WATER CODE § 26.179(i)).
102. Id. at 876.
103. 952 S.W.2d 454, 472 (Tex. 1997). The test for analyzing the constitutionality of a
private delegation includes the following factors:
1. Are the private delegate's actions subject to meaningful review by a state
agency or other branch of state government?
2. Are the persons affected by the private delegate's actions adequately represented in the decisionmaking process?
3. Is the private delegate's power limited to making rules, or does the delegate also apply law to particular individuals?
4. Does the private delegate have a pecuniary or other personal interest that
may conflict with its public function?
5. Is the private delegate empowered to define criminal acts or impose criminal sanctions?
6. Is the delegation narrow in duration, extent, and subject manner?
7. Does the private delegate possess special qualifications or training for the
task delegated to it?
8. Has the legislature provided sufficient standards to guide the private delegate in its work?
Id.
104. Id. at 875 (citing Boll Weevil, 952 S.W.2d at 475).
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ests that may conflict with their public function, and the delegation is
that
broad in duration and extent."'10 5 Therefore, the court concluded
10 6
section 26.179 delegates legislative powers to private landowners.
Section 26.179 of the Texas Water Code Is an Unconstitutional
Delegation of Legislative Powers to Private Landowners
Based on the Boll Weevil eight-factor test, the court concluded that
TWC section 26.179 is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative
power. 10 7 Under the court's analysis, two Boll Weevil factors weighed in
favor of the delegation, four factors weighed against the delegation, and
two factors neither weighed for or against the delegation.
The court found that the third and fifth Boll Weevil factors weighed in
favor of the delegation. Under the third factor, the court found that the
limit of landowners' power to apply the law only to themselves and their
successors in interest weighed in favor of the delegation. 10 8 Section
26.179 does not give landowners the authority to apply a water quality
plan or decision to designate a water quality protection zone to individuals other than themselves or their successors in interest. 10 9 Similarly,
under the fifth factor, the court found that landowners' lack of power to
define criminal acts or impose criminal sanctions weighs in favor of the
delegation. 110
Under the court's analysis, the first and fourth Boll Weevil factors
weighed heavily against the constitutionality of the delegation in section
26.179. The court also determined that the second and fourth factors
weighed against the delegation. Under the first factor, the court determined that there is no meaningful TNRCC review of the landowners'
powers under section 26.179.111 Though water quality plans are subject
to some form of review by TNRCC, the court found that the landowners
could in many cases circumvent monitoring requirements, requirements
to modify water quality plans, and requirements to modify existing operational and maintenance practices."12 In addition, landowners' decisions
to exempt themselves from enforcement of municipal regulations are not
subject to any TNRCC review. 113 Because meaningful governmental review of landowners' powers could not be identified, the court found that
the first Boll Weevil factor weighed heavily against the constitutionally of
the delegation." 4 Under the fourth factor, which is also emphasized in
determinations regarding delegations to private interested parties, the
court found that landowners' pecuniary interests, which could conflict
2.

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

FM Props. Operating,22 S.W.3d at 878.
See id. at 877.
Id. at 880.
Id. at 885.
Id.
Id. at 886.
Id. at 883.
FM Props. Operating Co. v. City of Austin, 22 S.W.3d 868, 882-84 (Tex. 2000).
Id. at 884.
Id.
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with their public function, weighed heavily against the delegation. 1 5 The
court noted that landowners' have a pecuniary interest in maximizing
profit and minimizing costs, which could be at odds with the landowners'
public function to regulate water quality and decide which municipal regulations could or could not be enforced on their property. 1 6 Under the
second Boll Weevil factor, the court determined that the persons affected
by the landowners' actions are not afforded adequate representation in
the decision-making process."a 7 Neighbors, downstream water users, and
the general public could be adversely affected by landowners' designation
of water quality protection zones.1 18 However, public hearings on water
quality plans cannot be required and no parties are given the right to
appeal TNRCC approval of water quality plans or the designation of
water quality protection zones.11 9 In addition, affected persons are not
involved in any way in landowners' decisions regarding which municipal
1 20
regulations cannot be enforced in the water quality protection zones.
For these reasons, the court concluded that the second Boll Weevil factor
also weighed against the delegation.' 2 ' Finally, under the sixth factor, the
narrow subject matter of the delegation, broad extent and potentially indefinite duration of the delegation were determined to weigh against
22
finding the statute constitutional.1
The court found that neither the seventh nor the eighth Boll Weevil
factor weighed in favor of or against the delegation. Under the seventh
factor, the court analyzed whether landowners must possess any special
qualifications or training in land use planning, water quality management,
or public health, safety, and welfare management. 23 Although TWC section 26.179 does not require landowners to have any special qualifications, it does require landowners to hire registered professional engineers
to review the water quality plans and amendments.' 2 4 The statute requires that professional engineers evaluate certain things, providing a
check on the discretion of landowners. 125 However, engineers do not
take part in the landowners' decisions about which municipal regulations
the water quality protection plan and land use plans will comply with and
thus be enforceable on the landowners' property. 26 Accordingly, the
court found that the seventh Boll Weevil factor did not weigh for or
against the constitutionality of the delegation. Under the eight factor, the
court analyzed whether the sufficient legislative standards exist to guide
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id. at 885.
Id.
Id. at 884.
FM Props. Operating Co. v. City of Austin, 22 S.W.3d 868, 884 (Tex. 2000).
Id.
Id. at 885.
Id.
Id. at 886.
Id.
FM Props. Operating Co. v. City of Austin, 22 S.W.3d 868, 886-87 (Tex. 2000).
Id. at 887.

126. Id.
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landowners in their decision-making. 127 The court noted that section
26.179 provides detailed standards for water quality plans, including the
option of maintaining background levels of water quality or retaining the
first 1.5 inches of rainfall from developed areas. 12 8 However, section
26.179 does not specify what occurs if background water quality levels are
not maintained and how landowners are to exercise their broad authority
regarding modification of water quality plans. 12 9 Section 26.179 also
lacks sufficient standards to guide landowners in deciding which munici130
pal regulations can be enforced on their property.
As a whole, the court concluded that the Boll Weevil factors weighed
against the constitutionality of the delegation. 13 1 Accordingly, the court
held that "section 26.179 of the [Texas] Water Code is an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative power to private landowners.' 132
F.

CITY'S DISCHARGE OF TREATED WASTEWATER INTO STREAM

ABOVE LANDOWNERS' PROPERTY DID NOT CONSTITUTE TAKING
ABSENT FLOODING IN VIOLATION OF CITY'S DISCHARGE PERMIT

In an interesting case brought by landowners seeking to prevent the
discharge of treated sewage effluent into what was at best an intermittent
stream, the Austin Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the City of Georgetown. 133 The court held that discharging treated wastewater into the
stream was within the City of Georgetown's rights. Much of the opinion
hinged upon the meaning of watercourse and whether this particular part
of the property met the definition. The court viewed the issues as (1)
whether the stream was a watercourse belonging to the State of Texas,
rather than to plaintiffs, the Domels, and (2) if the stream was a watercourse, whether the City's discharge of the treated wastewater into the
stream that flowed through the Domels' property would constitute a constitutional taking of the Domels' property absent flooding of their property or a violation of the City's discharge permit.
The Domels owned their property for more than fifty years. Development north of Austin had begun to surround their farmland. A private
entity had owned land upstream of the Domels and had obtained a permit from the Texas Water Commission to discharge into a "stream" that
passed through their property. The private entity never constructed a
treatment plant and the City purchased the land and successfully applied
to the TWC for transfer of the permit. The City then applied to the TWC
to amend the permit to increase the maximum daily discharge volume
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 887.
130. FM Props. Operating Co. v. City of Austin, 22 S.W.3d 868, 887 (Tex. 2000).
131. Id. at 888.
132. ld. Justice Abbott filed a dissenting opinion, in which he was joined by Justices
Hecht and Owen. Justice Owen filed a separate dissenting 6pinion, in which she was
joined by Justices Hecht and Abbott.
133. Domel v. City of Georgetown, 6 S.W.3d 349, 361 (Tex. App. Civ.-Austin 1999).
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from 250,000 gallons per day to 2.5 million in advance of actually constructing a wastewater treatment plant.
In the course of the permit amendment process before the TWC, the
Domels and other downstream landowners protested the permit amendment application on the basis that the stream was dry six months out of
the year and would become a flowing stream with the discharge of the
City's effluent, causing interference with the use of the protestants' use of
their land. The Domels argued that the City should be required to pipe
the treated wastewater past their land and into a stream below their land.
On consideration of the landowners' arguments and factual positions, the
hearings examiner ruled that the stream was a "watercourse" and therefore was property of the State. The State has the power to grant parties
the right to discharge into a watercourse if the applicant for the discharge
permit can meet the requirements of that permit and show that the discharge will not adversely affect the quality of the water in the watercourse. The court determined that the discharge would not affect the
quality of the watercourse.
The hearings examiner's determinations were then passed to the Commissioners of the TWC, which ruled in favor of the City of Georgetown.
The Commissioners ruled that the discharge would not pose a threat to
water quality. Some of the specific rulings were that the discharge would
not result in an odor, would not adversely affect the designated uses of
the stream segment of public recreation, public water supply, and high
quality aquatic habitat, and that the stream had sufficient carrying capacity to contain the discharge. Based upon these and other findings the
Commissioners ruled that the protestants had no basis for requesting that
the TWC order that the discharge be piped past their land rather than
being discharged into the stream.
Subsequent to the issuance of the amended permit, the City constructed the wastewater treatment plant and in 1993, began discharging
into the stream. The City operated the wastewater treatment plant without any violation of its permit. In 1994, the Domels sued the City claiming the discharge resulted in a taking of or damage to their property
without compensation, in violation of the Texas Constitution. The
Domels contended that the discharge of effluent diminished the value of
their land. It is perhaps worth noting that in 1997, the same year the jury
trial took place, the Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission
("TNRCC") issued a renewed permit for the City.
A trial occurred, but through a series of procedural decisions, the trial
court ultimately granted a motion for summary judgment for the City.
The City's motion was supported by evidence that the tributary or stream
meets the definition of watercourse, including evidence from the TWC
hearing.
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1. Definition of Watercourse Determines Ownership of Water
After ruling that the City failed to raise the issue of collateral estoppel
based upon decisions before the TWC, the Appeals Court turned to the
first question of whether the uncontroverted summary judgment evidence
established the stream was in fact a "watercourse." The import of this
proof is that a watercourse belongs to the state and what is referred to as
"diffuse water" belongs to the landowner before it flows into a watercourse. 134 The court noted that the parties agreed upon the seminal case
and the factors set forth therein to determine whether a stream is a watercourse or diffuse water. The determinative case was a 1925 decision in
Hoefs v. Short.135 In this decision, the Texas Supreme Court created a
three part test for determining if water on land was in fact a watercourse:
the stream must have (1) a defined bank and beds, (2) a current of water,
and (3) a permanent source of supply. With respect to the first element,
the court allows that the bed and banks of the stream be "'slight, imperceptible, or absent"' in some instances without the stream losing its
character as a watercourse.1 36 With respect to the second element,
stream flow may be intermittent as opposed to continuous, and can be
dry for long periods of time. The latter may have been seen by courts as
necessary since many streams in arid parts of Texas are dry for substantial
parts of the year. With respect to the third element, the question of supply, again, did not require a continuous supply. "This ...means that the
stream must be such that similar conditions will produce a flow of water,
and that these conditions recur with some regularity, so that they establish and maintain a running stream for considerable periods of time. ' 137
In Hoefs, the stream at issue ran for two days or so after a heavy rain, and
did so on average five or six times a year.
The test then for a watercourse is not terribly stringent. Again, this test
undoubtedly reflects the nature of streams in Texas, where in fairly arid
regions, streams flow on an intermittent basis. The court then applied
this test to the facts introduced to the trial court in its summary judgment
motion. The city offered the evidence entered at the TWC permit hearings, excerpts from one of the plaintiff's depositions, U.S. Geological Survey maps, and the affidavit of the a City employee involved in its utilities
department. The affidavit stated that the stream had defined bed and
banks. Aerial and ground level photographs showed a defined bed and
banks. However, Mrs. Domel in her deposition disagreed with this view.
In addressing the first element, the Appeals Court determined that
Mrs. Domel's testimony that the stream was a drainage area and did not
have defined banks was merely conclusury. Changes in the course of the
134. Id. at 353 (citing TEX. WATER CODE § 11.021(a); Turner v. Big Lake Oil Co., 96
S.W. 2d 221, 228 (Tex. 1936); Goldsmith & Powell v. State, 159 S.W.2d 534, 535 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1942, writ ref'd); S. Tex. Water Co. v. Bieri, 247 S.W.2d 268, 272 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Galveston 1952, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
135. 273 S.W.3d 785 (Tex. 1925).
136. Domel, 6 S.W.3d at 353 (citing Hoefs, 273 S.W. at 787).
137. Id.
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stream did not establish the lack of bed and banks, because as the court
noted, watercourses may change their course over time. Finally, the court
ruled that beds and banks may be absent at times. The court then looked
to another case which involved a wide valley or drainage area of onefourth to one-half mile wide. The lack of flooding and the narrow area in
which the water flowed, convinced the court that the plaintiffs had not
raised an issue of material fact. The court concluded that the evidence
showed that a defined bed and banks existed.
As to the second and third elements, Mrs. Domel admitted that before
the wastewater treatment plant was constructed, the stream had an intermittent flow, flowing after rainfall, and dry for about half the year. Thus,
the court ruled that she had admitted that the tributary has a current and
a permanent supply of water, and all three elements of the test for a watercourse had been met.
It should be noted that the Chief Justice dissented in the case based
upon the facts presented in the summary judgment motion. Chief Justice
Aboussie believed that a fact issue had been created that should have
been tried. She concluded that the affidavit of Mrs. Domel should have
been considered true and every inference given in her favor and resolving
all doubts over the bed and banks question. Thus, a fact question would
have been created between her stated observations and those of the City
employee and the other evidentiary documents submitted.
2.

Constitutional Taking or Damage Claim for Discharge into a
Watercourse

The court then turned to the plaintiffs' claim that even if the stream is a
watercourse, the discharge of treated effluent constitutes a taking of private property without compensation under the Texas Constitution. The
city argued that there was no property right for the city to take. In addressing this issue, the court applied the three part test to determine
whether a taking occurred. A taking is (1) an intentional act of the government, (2) accomplished for a public purpose, (3) that damages or
138
takes property from a private citizen.
The court reviewed the history of Texas law on ownership of watercourses or the water within those streams. In addition to historical decisions regarding the State's ownership of larger watercourses and the
reservation of unappropriated rights in water of rivers and natural
streams within arid portions of the state, in 1913 the Texas Legislature
amended the Water Code to declare the unappropriated water of flowing
rivers and streams, among many other surface waters "the property of the
State ....,139 In 1917, the Texas Constitution was amended to provide
that the conservation and development of various natural resources, in138. See id. at 357 (citing Steele v. City of Houston, 603 S.W.2d 786, 788-92 (Tex. 1980);
Bennett v. Tarrant County W.C.I.D. No. 1, 894 S.W. 441 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1995,
writ denied)).
139. TEX. WATER CODE § 11.021(a).

1376

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54

cluding rivers and streams, are public rights and duties, and that the Legislature shall pass laws to carry out those rights and duties. 140 Thus, the
court concluded that while a landowner may own the land under an unnavigable watercourse, the State retains the right to use the watercourse
to transport water and to otherwise conserve and develop such water resources. The court noted otherwise the State would be required to obtain
a right or easement every time it exercised this power and duty, or each
time the State used a watercourse across private lands a taking of private
property requiring compensation would result.
The court then turned to case law and found no cases which would
prohibit the state from using its watercourses to transport water. The
court ruled that if the state's use flooded a person's land, their such use
might result in a taking. 141 In this case, the court noted that the Domels
did not allege that their property had been flooded and the City did not
claim any right to flood their land. The City did not argue that it has the
right to use the watercourse to transport untreated wastewater, which the
court would apparently view as a taking. 142
The Domels next tactic was to argue that the law for use of watercourses only applied to "natural" flow, not flow created by human acts.
The appellate court disregarded the cases set forth by the Domels because they concerned the diversion of surface water before entering a
water course, rather than water in water course.
Moreover, the court considered treated wastewater to be a valuable
resource under Texas law. It concluded that based on several statutory
and regulatory provisions that man-induced flow was not distinguishable
from natural flow, both were included in the measurement of stream flow
and that the man-made flow was encouraged. The court noted that under
the TNRCC's definition of "baseline or normal flow". "accountable effluent discharges from municipal, industrial, irrigation or other uses of
ground or surface waters may be included at times."'1 43 For water taken
from a stream and returned, "return water or return flow" is specifically
defined to include wastewater effluent, and the regulations require that it
be returned to a water supply or watercourse at a point designated by a
permit in conformance with the parameters set forth by the State. 144
The final attack by the Domels was to argue that the statutory language
and permit language required permission from downstream landowners
to allow the discharge. The relevant section of the Texas Water Code
provides:
140. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 59.
141. 6 S.W.3d at 359 (citing Brazos River Auth. v. City of Graham, 354 S.W.2d 104-05
(Tex. 1962); City of Odessa v. Bell, 787 S.W.2d 787 S.W.2d 525, 527-28 (Tex. App.-El
Paso 1990, no writ)).
142. Id. at 359 (citing Abbott v. City of Kaufman, 717 S.W. 2d 927, 929 (Tex. App.Tyler 1986, writ dism'd)).
143. TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 297.1.
144. Id. §§ 297.1, .45(b).

2001]

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

1377

Nothing in this chapter affects the right of a private corporation or
individual to pursue any available common law remedy to abate a
condition of pollution or other nuisance, to recover damages to enforce a right, or to prevent or seek redress or compensation
for the
145
violation of a right or otherwise redress an injury.
The Domels also cited provisions in the permitting regulations stating
that the permit does not create a property right and that the permit does
not grant the permittee any right to use public or private property to
convey the discharge, and that the permittee must obtain the right to use
the discharge route. 146 In construing these provisions, the court concluded that the provisions only stated the permit itself did not create a
right for the permittee, but did not create a substantive right in other
parties either. Thus, it did not address the question of whether the
Domels' had a property right, but the court had to look at other law to
make this determination.
The case was not limited to briefing by the City of Georgetown, although it was the only litigant. Other municipal organizations filed amicus briefs. These parties pointed out, in addition to their legal arguments,
that there are over 1200 cities in Texas operating wastewater plants and
about 500 discharge into small watercourses. The Amici pointed out the
large expense that would be imposed on these municipalities if they had
to obtain easements from landowners even when the water meets the discharge parameters approved by the state as meeting water quality
standards.
The court noted that this did not address the legal question, but that
the concern expressed by the Domels was a classic NIMBY, not in my
backyard, syndrome. "[T]he City is responsible for providing clean and
safe water to its residents for domestic use. Part of that process includes
recycling used water by cleaning it and returning it to a watercourse or
water source pursuant to state law." The Domels argued the water has a
"stigma," "no matter how clean the wastewater is." The court said that it
did not believe that the law recognized a cause of action based upon this
"stigma." Thus, the court concluded that the legislative scheme and the
constitutional provisions, precluded the Domels' claim.
G.

STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS IN ENVIRONMENTAL TORT SUITS

Knowledge of a potential claim has been a key issue in many environmental lawsuits. The application of statutes of limitations is often the
basis of much pre-trial discovery and motion practice. Many of these
controversies have revolved around the discovery rule. The discovery
rule has generally been applied to environmental claims, particularly
those involving contamination of soil and groundwater.
The discovery rule provides that a claim accrues and the statute of limitations begins to run when the prospective plaintiff knows or through the
145.
146.

TEX. WATER CODE
TEX. ADMIN. CODE

§ 7.004.
§ 305.122(b).
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exercise of reasonable due diligence should know of the injury. Often
times the issue of "should have known" is central to whether or not the
plaintiff or plaintiffs' claims have expired.
In two cases decided during the Survey period, this issue was decided
against the plaintiffs. The first case because the press coverage of the
relevant events should have brought the alleged injury to the plaintiffs'
attention. The second case because the advice of the plaintiffs' own expert or the environmental agency put the plaintiffs on notice of their injury and potential claims.
1.

Constructive Notice May Be Sufficient to Start the Running of
Statutes of Limitations

The first case, Crofton v. Amoco Chemical Co.,147 the court considered
whether the constructive notice to the plaintiffs made the injury not inherently undiscoverable. The claims arose with respect to the Motco
Superfund Site in La Marque, Texas. Plaintiffs were residents of two subdivisions, a trailer park, or employees of a freight company, all of which
were adjacent to the Motco site. The waste disposal company was ordered to clean up the site in 1976. In 1983, the site was declared a
"Superfund" site and listed on the National Priorities List. Three years
later, the United States government sued the persons it contended were
liable to address the contamination at or emanating from the site.
Almost ten years later, the plaintiffs filed suit for personal injuries and
property damage allegedly resulting from the chemical wastes disposed of
at the site. The claims that were brought were public nuisance, private
nuisance, nuisance per se, and trespass. The issue for alleged property
damages was one the trial court reviewed in deciding on the defendant's
motion for summary judgment, the trial court considered whether the
claim for alleged property damages was barred on limitations grounds.
The trial court ruled that all of plaintiffs' claims for permanent injury to
land were barred by limitations and that for temporary damages, all of
plaintiffs' claims arising more than two years prior to filing suit were
barred.
The first issue the appellate court reviewed was the question of constructive notice of plaintiffs' alleged injuries to their property. The court
cited prior Texas Supreme Court precedent on two issues. One was that
constructive notice means that a person is deemed to have actual notice
of certain matters 1 48 through an irrebuttable presumption. 149 The defendants had relied upon a 1991 case that was also before the Fourteenth
District Court of Appeals in Houston. That case, Hues v. Warren Petroleum Co.,150 had upheld a summary judgment based upon constructive
notice arising from news reports of gas leaks and disposal of brine. In
147.
148.
149.
150.

No. 14-98-01412-CV, Fourteenth Dist. Houston, Dec. 9, 1999.
HECI Expl. Co. v. Neel, 982 S.W.2d 881, 887 (Tex. 1988)
Id.; Mooney v. Harlin, 622 S.W.2d 83, 85 (Tex. 1981).
814 S.W.2d 526, 531 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, writ denied).
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Hues, the plaintiffs filed suit in 1985 for negligence, nuisance, and trespass for gas leaks that occurred in 1980 and brine disposal that started in
1956. The defendants had attached to their motion for summary judgment filed with the trial court newspaper articles reporting on these
events. The appellate court concluded that these newspaper articles and
surrounding publicity of the gas leaks were such that the plaintiffs were
1 51
put on notice of the events.
In the Crofton case, the defendants attached an affidavit of one of their
attorneys and several newspaper articles from six local newspapers.
Plaintiffs challenged this evidence as hearsay. The court concluded that
the newspapers were not hearsay because they were not being offered to
prove the matter asserted in these articles, but only to show notice of the
site's existence. The court further concluded that newspapers do not require authentication under the Texas Rules of Evidence.
Several of the plaintiffs filed affidavits claiming that they do not read
newspapers and were not aware of any news coverage of the site. The
court concluded that regardless of whether the newspapers were actually
read, the site received widespread notice in the area. Thus, the plaintiffs
were put on notice because of the publicity. The court reviewed this issue
in the context of the discovery rule, which, it should be remembered, is
based on the concept that the plaintiff new or reasonably should have
known of the injury based upon exercise of reasonable diligence.
What the court went on to say is that the discovery rule only applies
when the nature of the injury is inherently undiscoverable and the injury
itself must be objectively verifiable. 152 The court concluded that the inherently undiscoverable aspect of the application of the discovery rule is
that "accrual of the cause of action is delayed when the wrong and the
injury were unknown to the plaintiff because of the very nature and not
because of the fault of the plaintiff." The plaintiffs conceded at oral argument before the court that the claims of nuisance and trespass by their
nature cannot be inherently undiscoverable because the causes of action
require the plaintiff to prove the interference with the use and enjoyment
of their property. The court went on to conclude that the widespread
publicity of the site made it impossible to allege that the injuries claimed
were inherently undiscoverable. Thus, the court refused to apply the discovery rule to the case.
This case stands for an important proposition: for environmental cases,
particularly groundwater contamination cases, a claim for nuisance or
trespass inherently requires interference with the quiet enjoyment of the
plaintiff's land; thus, to argue the injury is inherently undiscoverable is
contradictory to interference with the enjoyment of the land. By virtue of
the very nature of these causes of action, the court appeared to conclude
the discovery rule would not apply to such claims.
151. Id. at 528.
152. HECI Exploration,982 S.W.2d at 886.
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Plaintiffs also lost their claims for fraudulent concealment because they
failed to present any proof. Additionally, the minor plaintiffs lost their
claims because they failed to properly plead their minority status.
2. Communications with Parties Regarding Potential Contamination
May Start Running of Limitations Period
In another case, the Court of Appeals of El Paso ruled that plaintiffs
had lost their claims due to the running of the statute of limitations. 153 In
this case, plaintiffs were also alleging their groundwater had been contaminated due to the actions of defendants. Several issues on statutes of
limitations were before the court. First, a question arose as to whether
some of the defendants had properly raised in the trial court and obtained a ruling on whether the plaintiffs' alleged injuries were temporary
or permanent. The City of Midland had filed a motion for summary judgment prior to the one ultimately ruled upon by the trial court. The other
defendants had not filed such a motion and did not take the necessary
action to adopt the motion on their own. The City of Midland had asked
the trial court to take judicial notice of the prior motion, but did not obtain a ruling on that motion. The trial court had previously denied that
motion, and no request was made to reconsider the ruling. Thus, the appellate court ruled the granting of summary judgment on temporary damages was in error, and reversed this decision.
The court also ruled that the City had failed to properly attack the
plaintiff's claim for a continuing tort and that the other defendants had
failed to properly plead their motion with respect to the plaintiff's claim
for injunctive relief.
The court then turned to the motion for summary judgment filed by a
group of environmental consultants who were named as defendants,
which the court referred to as the "Professional Defendants." This motion was filed as a no evidence motion under Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 166(a)(I). The motion asserted that the plaintiff did not have any
evidence that the Professional Defendants caused their injury. Plaintiff
did not identify any evidence supporting causation, even though he attached 500 pages of documents to his response to the motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff did not specify which documents supported
causation, and the court was not required "sift through a record of this
154
size to find Appellant's evidence for him."'
The court then moved to the question of permanent damages and the
applicability of the statute of limitations. The question of the date plaintiff's claim accrued hinged upon letters or notices received from other
parties. The plaintiff claimed that his cause of action did not accrue until
he received a report in November 1994 from the Texas Railroad Commission ("TRRC") that the contamination of his groundwater did not arise
153. Walton v. City of Midland, 24 S.W.3d 853, 861 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 2000 pet.).
154. Id. at 858 (citing Rogers v. Ricane Enters., Inc., 772 S.W.2d 76, 81 (Tex. 1989)).
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from oil field sources. The defendants argued that his cause of action
accrued in 1987 when he contacted the TRRC regarding a blow down pit
on his property. From 1987 to 1994, plaintiff contacted or corresponded
with the TRRC and the Texas Water Commission ("TWC") about concerns of soil and groundwater contamination. In 1988, plaintiff received a
letter from an environmental consultant he hired that based on TRRC
reports of soil testing in the blow down pit, stating that some the chemicals may have migrated to the groundwater. In 1993, the TWC advised
him that groundwater testing was necessary to determine if the groundwater was contaminated. In November of 1994, the plaintiff was told that
the groundwater contamination at this property was not caused by oil
field sources.
The appellate court in reviewing these and other notices and communications held that the plaintiff's claims accrued no later than November 18,
1994, as he agreed. Thus, suit for permanent damages to land would have
to have been filed by November 19, 1996 to fall within the limitations
period. One defendant was not sued until after that date. For other defendants, the court ruled that the plaintiff knew or should have known no
later than 1993 that there was an actionable injury to his land and groundwater. The TWC advised him that contamination extended to a depth of
17 feet in the soil and that a groundwater monitoring well should be installed to determine if the groundwater were contaminated. The court
ruled that based upon this advice or notice, a reasonable person should
have investigated the groundwater. The court further ruled that the
plaintiff contacted the TRRC for further information and the plaintiff
"simply chose to wait until more evidence had been developed before he
filed his claim. This is not permissible."
The plaintiff could not toll his cause of action because the TRRC did
not take action to investigate the groundwater. The court ruled that the
plaintiff could have taken independent action to investigate the groundwater underlying his property. Finally, the court ruled that he did not
have to know the source of the contamination before the statute began to
run.
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